BY: MUHAMMAD BELLO ABDULLAHI.
There is a thin line between political strategy and political overreach.
A political adviser is supposed to build bridges, reconcile competing interests, expand a political coalition and help the President understand the mood of the people. But when political advice begins to produce factional battles, alienate influential stakeholders and deepen divisions within the ruling party, a legitimate question arises:
Is the President’s political machinery still building the North—or beginning to destroy the political coalition it was created to protect?
That question is increasingly relevant to the role of Ibrahim Kabir Masari, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s Special Adviser on Political Affairs.
Masari is not an outsider to northern politics. He comes from Katsina, one of the most politically important states in the North-West, and has deep connections within the APC establishment. His elevation to the position of Special Adviser on Political Affairs gave him an important role in the Presidency’s political calculations ahead of 2027.
But political influence carries a danger: the more powerful an adviser becomes, the greater the temptation to build a personal political structure around the office.
And that is where the questions begin.
KATSINA: THE FIRST WARNING LIGHT
Katsina provides perhaps the clearest example of the political dilemma.
The state has traditionally been one of the APC’s strongest northern bases. In February 2026, Katsina APC stakeholders publicly endorsed President Tinubu and Governor Dikko Umar Radda for 2027. The state government described the party as united and fully mobilised.
But by August, reports emerged of a growing political confrontation between the Radda camp and political interests associated with Ibrahim Masari.
The immediate controversy involved campaign billboards bearing images of President Tinubu and Masari. Two senior security aides attached to Governor Radda were reportedly invited to police headquarters in Abuja over the alleged destruction of the billboards. The police said the officials were invited for questioning rather than arrested or detained.
The deeper issue, however, was political.
Reports described an emerging struggle between the governor’s political structure and Abuja-based political actors associated with Masari.
That should concern the Presidency.
Because the question is not who wins a battle over billboards.
The question is why a state that publicly declared itself united behind Tinubu should suddenly become associated with a struggle between two camps within the same ruling party.
Even more interestingly, on September 9, Katsina APC stakeholders again passed a vote of confidence in Governor Radda and pledged to work for APC victory in 2027.
This means the situation is more complicated than simply saying “Katsina APC has collapsed.”
It has not.
But the existence of competing centres of influence should be a warning to Abuja.
A political adviser should strengthen the governor’s structure, not create an alternative power centre that competes with it.
THE MASARI QUESTION
There is an important distinction here.
There is no established evidence that Masari personally ordered anyone to destroy billboards, undermine Governor Radda or divide the Katsina APC.
Those are political allegations, not proven facts.
But politics is also about perception.
If influential APC members begin to believe that a presidential adviser is building a parallel structure against an elected APC governor, the damage can occur even without a formal instruction from the adviser.
This is the danger of political over-centralization.
The President may believe he is strengthening his political network, while governors may perceive the same strategy as an attempt to weaken them.
That creates distrust.
And distrust is one of the most expensive commodities in politics.
KANO: THE POWER OF GRASSROOTS POLITICS
Kano presents a different challenge.
The state remains arguably one of the most important electoral battlegrounds in northern Nigeria.
The political journey from the 2023 election to the present has been complicated by the continuing influence of Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, the emergence of Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf as an APC figure, and the movement of politicians between political platforms.
In May 2026, Kano APC formally adopted Tinubu as its sole presidential candidate and also backed Governor Abba Yusuf for a second term.
The governor subsequently launched a grassroots mobilisation campaign aimed at securing victory for Tinubu and APC candidates in 2027.
But Kano’s political environment remains fluid.
As recently as September 2026, former Kano deputy governor and 2023 APC governorship candidate Nasir Gawuna was reported to have rejected overtures to return to the APC despite defections by some of his political associates.
This illustrates a larger problem for the Presidency.
Kano cannot be managed entirely through Abuja political calculations.
The state has its own political history, personalities, networks and grievances.
The danger is that federal political operatives may underestimate local political structures while assuming that appointments and endorsements automatically translate into votes.
They do not.
KADUNA: THE COST OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION
Kaduna offers an even more dramatic warning.
Governor Uba Sani was once politically associated with former Governor Nasir El-Rufai. Today, the relationship has dramatically changed.
El-Rufai has left the APC for the African Democratic Congress, while Governor Uba Sani remains an important APC ally of President Tinubu. Premium Times described the 2027 contest as being shaped by the El-Rufai–Uba Sani fallout, opposition realignment and persistent insecurity.
The political consequences are substantial.
A former governor who once controlled a formidable political structure is now positioned on the opposite side of the political divide.
That should make any political strategist uncomfortable.
Because political parties survive by absorbing disagreements.
They become vulnerable when disagreements become personal.
There have also been accusations from the ADC that the federal government is politically persecuting El-Rufai. Those claims remain allegations by opposition figures and should not be treated as established fact.
Nevertheless, the political perception matters.
If a significant northern political figure and former APC governor becomes convinced that the ruling party has closed its doors to him, his political network does not necessarily disappear.
It can migrate.
And Kaduna demonstrates exactly how quickly political networks can change direction.
JIGAWA: LOYALTY DOES NOT MEAN BLANK CHEQUE
Jigawa currently presents a more favourable picture for Tinubu.
Governor Umar Namadi has been openly supportive of the President’s 2027 ambition. In May 2026, Namadi pledged that Jigawa would deliver more than one million votes to Tinubu.
The APC also affirmed Namadi as its 2027 governorship candidate.
But Jigawa should not be viewed simply as a guaranteed electoral warehouse.
Political loyalty is not the same thing as permanent voter loyalty.
The people of Jigawa, like voters elsewhere, will ultimately judge the federal government on security, food prices, employment, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunity.
A governor can pledge one million votes.
But no governor physically carries one million voters to the polling booth.
The voters decide.
This distinction is essential to understanding northern politics.
ZAMFARA: A POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY WITH A SECURITY PROBLEM
Zamfara presents perhaps the most important strategic opportunity for Tinubu.
Governor Dauda Lawal moved from the PDP to the APC in March 2026, citing the crisis within the PDP and its continuing legal disputes.
His defection was subsequently welcomed by Vice-President Kashim Shettima and several governors at a major political gathering in Gusau.
The APC later endorsed both Tinubu and Lawal for 2027.
On paper, this looks like a major victory for Tinubu.
But Zamfara’s political future cannot be separated from insecurity.
When Governor Lawal met President Tinubu in April, security, economic development and political issues were among the matters discussed, with the President reportedly pledging additional federal support for security operations.
This is where the Presidency’s political advisers need to understand the difference between political mobilisation and political delivery.
A rally cannot defeat banditry.
An endorsement cannot rebuild a destroyed community.
A campaign slogan cannot replace security.
If the Presidency wants Zamfara’s voters, it must first demonstrate that the federal government can help restore normal life.
THE NORTH IS BIGGER THAN APC
One of the greatest strategic mistakes any political adviser can make is to assume that the North is politically homogeneous.
It is not.
Kano is not Katsina.
Katsina is not Kaduna.
Kaduna is not Jigawa.
Jigawa is not Zamfara.
And Zamfara is not Sokoto, Kebbi, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Borno, Plateau, Niger,Kwara or Nasarawa.
Each state has different political histories and different local power structures.
Even within each state, voters in urban areas may have priorities different from those in rural communities.
The political class must therefore stop treating the North as a single electoral machine.
THE DANGER OF PARALLEL POWER CENTRES
The most dangerous political structure is not always an opposition party.
Sometimes it is a ruling party with too many competing centres of authority.
A governor controls the state.
A former governor controls another network.
A federal minister controls another.
A presidential adviser builds another.
Party officials control another.
Traditional institutions have their own influence.
Business interests have another.
Youth movements create another.
When all these interests compete for the President’s attention, the result can be political fragmentation.
The President may believe he is balancing interests.
The political class may interpret it as divide-and-rule.
That is where an adviser can unintentionally become a destroyer.
Not because he consciously wants to destroy the party.
But because his strategy creates more enemies than allies.
WHAT TINUBU SHOULD BE TOLD
President Tinubu needs advisers who will tell him the truth—not simply what he wants to hear.
They must tell him when a governor is unhappy.
They must tell him when party members feel excluded.
They must tell him when northern voters are angry.
They must tell him when insecurity is destroying confidence.
They must tell him when economic reforms are producing political pain.
And they must tell him when political appointments are creating resentment.
A political adviser who reports only success is not helping the President.
He is insulating him from reality.
2027 WILL SEPARATE POLITICAL THEATRE FROM POLITICAL REALITY
The coming election will provide the final judgment.
Tinubu’s political machinery can organise rallies across the North.
It can produce endorsements.
It can attract defectors.
It can assemble governors.
It can fill stadiums.
It can produce impressive photographs.
But none of those things can vote.
The voter votes.
And the northern voter is increasingly exposed to competing political messages.
The emergence of the ADC as a major opposition platform, the movement of politicians across party lines and the continuing importance of figures such as Kwankwaso and El-Rufai mean that the 2027 contest will not necessarily be a simple APC-versus-PDP battle.
The APC therefore has a strategic choice.
It can build a broad coalition based on consultation, performance and inclusion.
Or it can allow competing political centres to fight for control until former allies become enemies.
THE FINAL WARNING.!
Ibrahim Kabir Masari may yet prove to be an effective political strategist for President Tinubu.
The evidence does not justify declaring him a “political destroyer” as a matter of fact.
But the political questions surrounding his growing influence—particularly the reported Katsina tensions—deserve serious scrutiny.
The Presidency should ask a simple question:
Are our political advisers expanding our coalition, or are they merely expanding their own political influence?
That distinction could determine the fate of the APC in the North.
Because if political advisers spend more energy fighting governors, former governors and fellow party leaders than engaging voters, the party may wake up too late to discover that its greatest political problem was not the opposition.
It was itself.
In 2027, the North will not vote for political advisers. It will vote for the consequences of political decisions.
And that is why President Tinubu must be careful about the people who speak politics into his ears.
A political adviser should be a bridge between the President and the people.
He must never become the bridge that collapses under the weight of his own ambition.
Muhammad Bello is a Journalist and write from Ganjuwa who can be reached on: muhammadbellom32c@gmail.com